I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Mississippi.
I earned my PhD in Finance from Drexel University. My research examines the intersection of government and empirical corporate finance, specifically in the areas of innovation, labor, and corporate governance.
I received the Southern Finance Association Outstanding Doctoral Student Paper Award (2024), as well as the John J. Clark Award for Outstanding Research in Economics (2024).
Email: torinmcfarland@gmail.com or tmmcfar1@olemiss.edu
Working Papers
- Dr. John J. Clark Outstanding Economics Research Paper Award, LeBow College of Business, 2024.
- Outstanding Doctoral Student Paper, Southern Finance Association, 2024.
Abstract: I study how regulatory burden disrupts the careers of productive inventors. Using structural topic modeling and the text of paperwork regulations, I develop a time-varying inventor-specific measure of regulatory burden. I show that inventors facing high burden exhibit decreased productivity and lower quality innovations. A 1 standard deviation increase in time spent on compliance decreases patenting by 5.4% and decreases citations accrued by 5.1%. These results are stronger in Star Inventors. In labor markets, I find evidence consistent with a disutility channel: after experiencing increases in burden, inventors are more likely to change jobs and seek lower burden technology areas.
Presentations: Financial Intermediation Research Society Annual Meeting 2025, Georgetown University Spring 2025 Labor and Finance Group Conference, Southern Finance Association 2024, Financial Management Association 2024, Financial Management Association European Conference 2024, American Law & Economics Association 2024 (Roundtable), Eastern Finance Association 2024, American Finance Association 2024 (PhD Poster Session), Financial Management Association 2023 (Special PhD Paper Presentation and Doctoral Consortium), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2023, Financial Management Association European Conference 2023 (Doctoral Consortium), IFPHD Seminar 2024, University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) 2025, University of Massachusetts Amherst 2025, University of Denver 2024, Marquette University 2024, Florida Atlantic University 2024, San Diego State University 2024
Escaping Non-Compete Agreements: The Role of Social Connections
with Jason (Pang-Li) Chen and Melissa Crumling
Abstract: This paper shows that social ties propagate the effects of stricter non-compete agreement (NCA) enforcement across geographic boundaries. Inventors respond to tighter NCA policies by relocating to distant counties where they have stronger social connections. Destination regions with high social proximity to strengthening states experience a 7% increase in inventor population and innovation output. These gains concentrate in young firms, where information asymmetry is high. Relocated inventors help young firms secure initial patents and spur new firm formation, while large public firms see no comparable spillovers. Overall, social connections redistribute talent and foster cross-regional innovation under local labor mobility restrictions.
Presentations: Southern Finance Association 2024*, American Law & Economics Association 2024 (Roundtable)*, Eastern Finance Association 2024*, Columbia PE Conference PhD Workshop 2024*, IMFB Conference 2024*, Financial Management Association 2023*, WEFI Fellows Workshop 2023*, Drexel University Brownbag 2023
Limited Financial Reporting as a Takeover Barrier
with Eliezer Fich and Paolo Volpin
Abstract: US-listed firms with reduced financial reporting are 14\% less likely to become takeover targets than other firms. This finding is robust to propensity score matching, regression discontinuity (around the threshold for reduced reporting eligibility), and difference-in-differences analysis (leveraging the introduction of the smaller-reporting-companies category). Asymmetric information is the likely explanation: reduced-reporting firms exhibit wider bid-ask spreads; when acquired, they receive higher premia but less cash than other targets; and their positive revaluation persists even when the acquisition fails. Consistent with limited disclosure being a takeover barrier, firms without other takeover defenses are more likely to qualify for reduced financial reporting.
Presentations: Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting 2025, Bretton Woods Accounting and Finance Ski Conference 2025*, Bayes MARC Conference 2024*, Bocconi University 2025*, Rutgers University 2025*, University of Miami 2025*, University of Richmond 2025*, University of Delaware 2024*
Nota Bene: * indicates presentation by co-author